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Background: Increasing the market and system integration of renewable energy sources (RES) is regarded as key to
reducing the costs of RES support and transforming the electricity system. In several EU countries, feed-in premium
schemes have been implemented to better align RES production with electricity prices and to enhance the
efficiency of RES marketing by increasing direct participation of producers in electricity markets. This paper examines
the lessons learned from the German market premium scheme, which was introduced in the Renewable Energy
Sources Act 2012 as an optional alternative to feed-in tariffs. The 2014 reform of that law has made direct marketing
mandatory except for small RES plants, thus establishing the sliding market premium as the new primary instrument
of RES support.
Methods: Combining a qualitative economic analysis with insights from sociological research on direct marketing
and simulation results from agent-based modelling, we evaluate how well the optional market premium has
performed in setting incentives for demand-oriented RES production and efficient marketing of RES electricity.
Furthermore, we examine what efficiency gains can be realistically expected from the changes implemented in
2014, and discuss whether the direct marketing model adopted in Germany is a promising approach for improving
the market integration of RES.
Results: We find that direct marketing has made a positive contribution to the marketing efficiency of dispatchable
RES; for intermittent RES, it provides few structural changes compared to marketing through transmission system
operators. The benefits of a greater demand-orientation of RES feed-in remain limited when considering the extent
to which load shifting is incentivised. For intermittent RES in particular, incentives for demand-oriented feed-in are
only effective in times of negative electricity prices when voluntary curtailment is encouraged.
Conclusions: For the further development of mechanisms to support greater market proximity, differentiating
between the various RES according to their ability to respond to electricity price signals can prove advantageous.
Also, objectives such as improving security of supply and reducing the costs of transforming the electricity system
cannot be reached through RES market integration efforts alone but require an adaptation of electricity market
conditions to the requirements of RES.
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RES market integration - objectives and instrumental
implementation
As electricity generation from renewable energy sources
(RES) continues to expand in Europe, EU member states
are faced with the challenge of integrating the growing
proportion of renewables, and especially intermittent
renewables, into existing energy systems and electricity
markets [1,2]. In this process, increasing the market in-
tegration of RES is viewed as an important step towards
improving the alignment of RES feed-in to scarcity sig-
nals in electricity markets and systems, thus containing
the costs of RES expansion; these relate not only to the
costs of supporting RES but also to the wider costs of
transforming the electricity system [2,3]. The new EU
energy aid guidelines, for instance, stress that market-
based mechanisms should promote the ‘transition to a
cost-effective delivery’ (p. 23) and highlight the import-
ance of direct market participation and the assumption
of market responsibilities by RES producers [4]. In
principle, it appears sensible to differentiate between
two different dimensions of market integration (see
Table 1) [5-7]. Firstly, market integration aims for a stron-
ger alignment of RES feed-in to price signals in the electri-
city market as well as an efficient marketing of RES
electricity [5,6]. Incentives for this dimension of market
integration can be implemented in RES policy instruments
where prices are administered by the state, by changing
from a feed-in tariff which is paid independently from
market prices to a feed-in premium model where electri-
city prices influence total remuneration. This approach is
currently pursued by several EU member states usingTable 1 An overview of the objectives of market integration o
Market integration objectives Dimensions of achievement of o
Demand-oriented generation of RES
electricity and increased flexibility of
RES plants
Prevention of surplus supply situat
curtailment in times of negative el
Shift of feed-in to times when
demand is strong and prices are h
• Intermittent RES: Maintenance pla
design oriented towards market va
requirements
• Dispatchable RES: targeted load s
Increased remote controllability of
Participation of RES installations in
market
Efficient marketing of RES electricity Reduced transaction costs of mark
Increased forecasting quality and r
procuring balancing energy
Competition for efficient marketing
Market-driven production and
investment decisions
Competitive determination of RES
RES producers become regular ma
Based on BMU 2011 [7]; Klobasa et al. 2013 [6]; and Lehnert et al. 2014 [5-7].various different design options [8,9]. While fixed feed-in
premiums offer RES producers a set bonus on top of the
market price, sliding premiums balance out the differ-
ence between reference prices and average market prices
[10]. Here, total remuneration remains based on state-
determined prices, as is the case for fixed feed-in tariffs,
so that the long-term market risks for producers of RES
remain comparatively low. The second dimension of
market integration, on the other hand, encompasses a
competitive determination of the remuneration and a
competitive steering of investment decisions [11,12].
This involves a transition to treating RES producers as
regular market players with system responsibility, with
competitive support mechanisms and electricity market
revenues playing a significant role in their refinancing.
At present, discussions about the instrumental imple-
mentation of this dimension of market integration focus
primarily on competitive bidding processes, given that
the new EU guidelines on state aid express a clear pref-
erence for this instrument type [4]. A further distinction
is necessary between the market integration and system
integration of RES - the latter aims at improving RES’
contribution to grid stability [1,13] but is not the focus
of this article.
One example of a sliding feed-in premium scheme is
the German market premium model, which was initially
introduced into the RES support regime in 2012 as an op-
tional alternative to the fixed feed-in tariff in order to set
incentives for demand-oriented RES feed-in and efficient
marketing of electricity from RES. With the introduction
of the amended Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)
2014, this approach was further extended by makingf renewable energy sources
bjectives Contributions to overarching objectives
ions via voluntary
ectricity prices
Contribution of RES to security of supply is
increased;
igh:
Costs of RES promotion are reduced through an
increase in RES market value;
nning, installation
lue and system
Cost reductions in the overall system (e.g. lower
balancing energy prices and system integration
costs)
hifting
RES installations
the balancing energy
eting RES electricity RES promotion costs are reduced
eduction of costs of
forms
remuneration RES expansion costs are reduced
rket players
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elevating the market premium scheme to the standard re-
muneration model. In the literature, assessments of the
market premium scheme come to divided conclusions.
While some studies evaluate the promotion of market in-
tegration via the sliding market premium positively
[6,14,15], others are critical of the instrument. On the one
hand, market-determined incentives for RES producers
are regarded as insufficient to promote market integration
and reduce the costs of RES support [11,12,16,17]. On the
other hand, however, critics question the usefulness of a
direct marketing-driven integration of intermittent RES
into the marginal cost-based electricity market, which
may be structurally unsuitable to secure their long-term
refinancing [18-21]. Furthermore, there are trade-offs be-
tween the objective of exposing RES producers to mar-
ket price signals in order to increase the efficiency of
production and investment decisions on the one hand,
and the creation of a secure planning basis for RES in-
vestors, which is crucial to achieve a comprehensive
transformation to an RES-based electricity system, on
the other [13]. If RES producers carry a high share of
market risks, this would also tend to increase the costs
of supporting the implementation of RES objectives, be-
cause higher risks have to be compensated by higher
risk premiums in the remuneration [22-24].
The following article evaluates experiences gained in
Germany from the introduction of the sliding market
premium and discusses to what extent this form of
government-supported direct marketing can serve as a
promising instrument to promote the integration of
RES into the electricity market. The article begins with
an outline of the design of the sliding market premium
instrument and supplementary regulations on the pro-
motion of market integration in the EEG 2014, as well
as an overview of the development of participation in
direct marketing. This is followed by an evaluation of
experiences gained with the market premium under the
EEG 2012. Building on this, we examine to what extent
the new regulations set forth in the EEG 2014 can be
expected to make a greater contribution to the market
integration objectives of realising a demand-oriented
feed-in of RES and efficient marketing.
Methods
As a sliding feed-in premium with state-administered
prices, the market premium scheme does not aim for a
competitive control of RES investments [9,15]. Therefore,
our assessment of the scheme’s performance focusses on
the market integration objectives of realising a demand-
oriented generation of RES electricity and increased flexi-
bility of RES plants, as well as an efficient marketing or
RES electricity. Based on existing literature, measures
were identified which contribute to these objectives; theseare summarised in Table 1. Below, we discuss whether the
market premium scheme sets incentives for the adoption
of these measures and whether contributions to market
integration objectives are effective and efficient. To con-
duct this assessment, we review literature findings and
available data, and analyse the impact of incentives on
RES producers’ behaviour. This qualitative analysis is
complemented by simulation results from the agent-
based simulation model AMIRIS, which was developed
at the Institute of Engineering Thermodynamics at the
German Aerospace Center (DLR) in Stuttgart [25,26]
The special nature of this article is an explicit interdis-
ciplinary approach to the research topic which attempts
to integrate existing studies from sociological research
on markets [27], energy economics [9] and agent-based
modelling [26].
Results and discussion
Promoting market integration via the German market
premium model
In the market premium model under the Renewable En-
ergy Sources Act (EEG), producers of electricity from
RES receive the difference between technology-specific
reference prices and the actual, likewise technology-
specific, monthly average market price (EEG 2014 Annex
1). Under the EEG 2012, installation operators had the
option of switching between direct marketing and
feed-in tariffs, where the sale of electricity from RES is
centrally managed by transmission system operators
(TSOs). This is no longer possible under the EEG
2014. Only installations with a maximum installed cap-
acity of 500 kW are now eligible to receive the feed-in
tariff; and as of 2016, the obligation to participate in
direct marketing will be extended to all installations
with a capacity of over 100 kW (§ 37 (2) EEG 2014). In
exceptional cases, operators will still be able to fall
back on feed-in tariffs, with a 20% reduction in remu-
neration rates (§ 38 EEG 2014). The so-called ‘green
electricity privilege’ provided under § 39 EEG 2012,
whereby electricity suppliers benefitted from EEG sur-
charge reductions if a certain proportion of their elec-
tricity supply was sourced from directly marketed RES,
has also been removed from the new EEG. A further
amendment relates to the fact that under the EEG
2012, RES producers were eligible for a separately cal-
culated management premium to compensate for the
additional costs of trading and providing balancing en-
ergy. Under the EEG 2014, in contrast, the management
premium is implicit in the reference prices. For dispatch-
able renewables, this is reflected by a reduction of 0.2
cents/kWh in the reference price on which the fixed feed-
in tariff is based; while for intermittent renewables, the
reduction is 0.4 cents/kWh (§ 37 (3) EEG 2014). At the
same time, the remote control capability of RES
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2012 by offering higher management premiums for in-
stallations fitted with appropriate systems, will now be a
requirement for payment of the market premium (§ 35
sentence 1 no. 2 in conjunction with § 36 (1) EEG
2014).
As a measure aimed at strengthening the demand-
orientation of all renewable energy sources, the EEG
2014 also introduces cuts in financial support in times
of negative prices: In the case of installations commis-
sioned after 1 January 2016, the reference prices on
which the remuneration is based are to be reduced to
zero when the value of the hourly contracts on the EPEX
Spot exchange is negative in at least six consecutive hours
(§24 EEG 2014). Given that installations with an in-
stalled capacity of less than 500 kW are exempt, this
regulation applies only to larger installations for which
direct marketing is obligatory (§ 24 (3) EEG 2014). As
was the case under the EEG 2012, the market premium
for biogas plants will be bolstered by a capacity-oriented
flexibility premium (§§ 52 to 54 EEG 2014). In
addition, for biogas installations with a capacity
exceeding 100 kW, entitlement to feed-in tariff or pre-
mium payments has been limited to the share of the
annual amount of electricity generated which corre-
sponds to a power rating of 50% of the installed elec-
tric capacity (§ 47 (1) EEG 2014), a move intended to
guarantee flexible plant operations.
Meanwhile, the transition to a more market-driven
steering of investment decisions is supported in the
EEG 2014 by the proposed switch to a competitive bid-
ding process, which is geared towards establishing a
competitive determination of remuneration by 2017 at
the latest (§ 2 (5) EEG 2014). The details of its design
are still unclear [28], but the model is to be tested on
ground-mounted solar installations (§ 55 EEG 2014).Experiences with the market premium under the EEG
2012: participation in direct marketing
Since its introduction in 2012, the market premium has
successfully increased participation in direct marketing
(see Figure 1): In April 2014, a total of 49% of the in-
stalled capacity eligible for support under the EEG was
marketed under the market premium scheme [29,30]. At
the same time, the green electricity privilege, as an
alternative form of direct marketing, was largely
replaced while the option ‘other forms of direct mar-
keting’ without remuneration is practically irrelevant
(see Figure 2). Initially, a high proportion of wind
power producers in particular switched to the optional
market premium, but in the meantime participation
among other RES producers has also increased [9,31]:
In April 2014, almost 60% of biomass installationswere taking advantage of the model; and as much as
13% of solar installations were participating (see Figure 2).
Nonetheless, the success of the sliding market premium
can only really be measured by its contribution to the
actual market integration objectives.
Experiences with the market premium under the EEG
2012: efficient marketing of RES electricity?
Under the fixed feed-in tariff system, quantities of RES
electricity are traded on the day-ahead or intraday spot
market in accordance with the provisions of the Equal-
isation Scheme Ordinance (§ 2 AusglMechV). By com-
parison, the sliding market premium would lead to
more efficient marketing of RES if (a) direct marketing
reduces the transaction costs of market participation,
(b) balancing energy costs can be reduced as a result of
better RES feed-in forecasts and better management of
plant portfolios, e.g. by taking advantage of the ability to
control plants remotely or (c) innovative forms of mar-
keting can increase prices obtained for renewables by
optimising the choice of markets (e.g. intraday and
day-ahead spot market, balancing market, bilateral over-
the-counter contracts) (see Table 1). Whether this ap-
plies to the market premium model will be examined in
the following.
The majority of RES installation operators are not
conventional players in the established energy sector
and, as a result, most of them have neither infrastruc-
ture nor the knowledge required to sell the electricity
they produce on the central electricity markets them-
selves. Introducing RES installation operators to the
market was therefore only possible through electricity
traders (hereafter referred to as ‘direct marketers’). They
act as service providers to RES installation operators
and in that function offer a broad range of services such
as preparing feed-in forecasts, communicating sched-
ules to the grid operators as well as financially compen-
sating for deviations or purchasing additional electricity
to make up the scheduled amount. Based on their RES
supply forecasts and expected electricity prices, these
traders take the initial decision on behalf of the installa-
tion operator as to whether to remain within the feed-in
tariff scheme or to market directly. In the latter case,
they determine the time, the quantity and the market on
which RES electricity will be offered for sale. Direct
marketers also have access to the specific infrastructure
needed to be able to trade on the energy exchange [25].
Regarding the reduction of transaction costs, com-
pared with selling through TSOs, it can be said that ini-
tially additional costs are incurred because the TSOs still
market the quantities of electricity in the feed-in tariff
scheme. In addition, marketing costs are subject to
economies of scale because fixed costs make up a large
share of those costs [18,20,32]. Also, the larger the
Figure 1 Development of installed capacity in the market premium model (January 2012 - July 2014). ‘Gases’ encompass landfill, sewage and
mining gases. Authors’ representation based on 50Hertz et al. 2014 [29].
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energy will be, because larger portfolios are associated
with higher forecast accuracy [6]. This suggests that in
terms of transaction costs, large direct marketers come
closest to TSOs.
An approximate value for the additional costs of direct
marketing under the market premium scheme is provided
by the management premium: In 2012, this amounted
to approximately 467 million euros, while in 2013 an
estimated 354 to 400 million euros were paid out due
to a reduction in management premium rates [33-35].a
However, the management premium primarily acts asFigure 2 Direct marketing share of the total installed capacity eligible for E
mining gases. Authors’ representation based on 50Hertz et al.; Bundesnetzaan indicator for the additional support costs associated
with direct marketing, rather than for actual transac-
tion costs. Especially in 2012, it was found that an over-
compensation of the costs of direct marketing led to
high windfall profits, subsequently giving rise to stron-
ger cuts in the management premium rates for inter-
mittent RES [36]. While the management premium
pursuant to EEG 2012 forms the essential basis of dir-
ect marketing business models [18,37], its degressive
design increases cost pressure on marketers over time.
When it comes to the marketing of wind and photo-
voltaics (PV), the marketing channels used are mainlyEG remuneration (April 2014). ‘Gases’ encompass landfill, sewage and
gentur [29,30].
Purkus et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society  (2015) 5:12 Page 6 of 13the same as those used by TSOs, i.e. the intraday and
day-ahead spot market. This choice is structurally sup-
ported by the market premium because spot market
prices are used to calculate the market value, and there-
fore selling on other markets would entail higher levels
of revenue risk [6,38]. Biomass installations, on the other
hand, show greater participation in balancing markets
[6,39]. In principle, differences in flexibility options avail-
able to biomass installations in combination with heat
utilisation concepts mean that they require more indivi-
dualised marketing concepts than other RES, so that dir-
ect marketing is likely to increase efficiency. In the case
of intermittent RES, marketing innovations can be found
e.g. in the establishment of RES networks forming vir-
tual power plants, which have spread rapidly [40].
However, targeted marketing of the ‘green power’ char-
acteristic, as promoted by the green electricity privilege,
is not possible under the market premium model (§ 56
(2) EEG 2012 and § 80 (2) EEG 2014).
Summing up, it can be said that the efficiency benefits
that have been achieved with the marketing of wind and
PV are mainly attributable to the fact that not only new
installations but also existing ones were incentivised to
provide for remote control capability and availability of
real-time data [6]. However, the marketing channels
used are largely similar to those employed by TSOs, with
the exception of bioenergy and hydropower generators,
for whom the supply of balancing energy is profitable.
At present, direct marketing also leads to increases in
the transaction costs of RES marketing. A lowering of
these costs to a level that is comparable with marketing
through TSOs alone could be achieved primarily by
exploiting economies of scale. However, corresponding
stronger price competition between direct marketers
could promote processes of concentration [18,25,38].Experiences with the market premium under the EEG
2012: incentives for demand-oriented RES production and
flexibility?
A more demand-driven feed-in and greater flexibility in
RES production can be achieved when the market pre-
mium sets incentives to encourage (a) voluntary curtail-
ment in times of negative electricity prices, (b) in the
case of intermittent RES, electricity price-oriented main-
tenance planning and plant designs that are oriented
towards a maximisation of market value and aligned
with system requirements, (c) targeted load shifting of
dispatchable renewables, (d) increased remote control
capability of RES installations (cf. also (b) in the section
on efficient RES marketing above) and (e) participation
of RES producers in the balancing energy market (see
Table 1). Relevant factors for the analysis are not only
whether these measures are taken but whether in thisform they contribute to the overall objectives of security
of supply and cost reduction.
For intermittent RES with near-zero marginal costs,
incentives are set to make limited bids and/or to encour-
age curtailment in times of strongly negative electricity
prices [6,41]. Voluntary curtailment becomes profitable
when electricity traders participating in the spot market
have to pay buyers a higher amount than that which is
expected from the market premium payment including
the management premium [9]. Currently, for example,
wind energy plants in direct marketing curtail their pro-
duction at negative prices of approximately − €65/MWh
[42]. Their ability to respond depends upon the remote
control capability of the installation, which has been
growing since 2013 due, among other things, to corre-
sponding incentives in the management premium [6].
Apart from optimising maintenance planning, intermit-
tent RES have few other incentives for load shifting
[9,20]. Price signals are either too low or not consistent
enough to make it worthwhile to base decisions about
the location and the design of installations on market
value rather than on energy yield, or to stimulate invest-
ment in weak-wind installations or east-west facing PV
systems [43,44]. What is more, the advantages of the
market value of alternative installation concepts are
being eroded by the increasing number of relevant
suppliers [18]. In the case of balancing markets, prequal-
ification of intermittent RES is only possible to a limited
extent at present [5,38].
So far, there are no studies available on actual changes
in feed-in behaviour for dispatchable renewables. Basic-
ally, the market premium sets incentives for voluntary
curtailment when electricity prices fall below the differ-
ence between the marginal costs of production and the
expected market premium including the management
premium. For biogas plants, the uptake of the flexibility
premium provides insight into whether the conditions
for a demand-based, flexible operation are at least in ex-
istence [45,46]: In April 2014, 370 installations with ap-
proximately 216 MWel claimed the flexibility premium,
which corresponds to roughly 11% of the installed biogas
and biomethane capacities participating in direct mar-
keting [39]. After a slow start in 2012, the use of the
flexibility premium is meanwhile increasing rapidly; the
delay in uptake is explained by the fact that power plant
flexibilisation is associated with financial investments
and high information requirements [46].
Next to hydropower installations, biomass installa-
tions are the most active RES producers on the electri-
city balancing market. In April 2014, 24% of the directly
marketed biomass power capacity and 43% of the dir-
ectly marketed hydropower capacity were correspond-
ingly pre-qualified. So far, mostly negative balancing
energy is supplied [39,46]. Figure 3 gives an example of
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additional revenues through participation in direct mar-
keting including the balancing market for negative
balancing energy. The figure shows the results of a
simulation of the agent-based simulation model AMIRIS,
which is being developed at the Institute of Engineering
Thermodynamics of the German Aerospace Center (DLR)
in Stuttgart [25]. Especially for solid fuel-based thermal
power plantsb and large biogas installations, the poten-
tially achievable additional revenues of 6% and 11%,
respectively, are worthy of note.
The difference in the revenues of the two installations
mentioned above can be explained by different shares of
directly marketed capacity, which is higher for large bio-
gas installations. Although in this model small biogas in-
stallations with a maximum installed capacity of 350 kW
cannot participate in the balancing market, they still
profit indirectly from the other installations’ sales, as can
be seen from Figure 3. This results from the model as-
sumption that, due to the additional revenues achieved
on the balancing market, the direct marketers will also
increase bonus payments to their other customers which
is a possibility to improve their competitive position.
Finally, by exploiting balancing markets, the flexibilisa-
tion of installations can indeed have a positive effect on
their economic efficiency while also supporting the
system as a whole. Thus, it appears to make sense to in-
centivise a corresponding adaptation of installations and
to enable their participation in the balancing market,
where besides storage plant operators more and more
other new participants are competing.
Viewed on the whole, however, the market premium
currently has the character of a ‘curtailment premium’:
for intermittent renewables, curtailment signals become
effective when electricity prices are highly negative; for
dispatchable renewables, this occurs earlier due to posi-
tive marginal costs, especially since the supply ofFigure 3 Additional revenues generated by biomass installation operators
feed-in tariffs.negative balancing energy is profitable. For bioenergy
installations, in particular, the response to electricity
price signals sets important incentives for optimising the
use of biomass resources.
However, so far, the model sets few incentives for dis-
patchable renewables to engage in positive load shifting,
which might be desirable in order to increase the contri-
bution of RES to the energy supply when feed-in from
intermittent RES is low, and could contribute to the sta-
bility of the system. At present, this is also determined
by relatively low peak/off-peak spreads on the spot
market [47]. Furthermore, there are still few incentives
for dispatchable renewables to supply positive balancing
energy or for intermittent renewables to make market
value-oriented decisions about the design of their
installations.
By reducing the quantity of electricity that has to be
remunerated in times of low and negative prices, volun-
tary curtailment eases the EEG surcharge burden, which
is determined on the basis of the difference between the
feed-in tariff ’s or market premium’s reference prices and
the market value for RES electricity [6]. However, the
ongoing expansion of intermittent RES with near-zero
marginal costs and the high temporal coincidence of
their feed-in causes the market value of intermittent re-
newables to fall [25,48,49]. Even if the full costs of RES
generation were decreasing, this would in turn lead to
an increasing burden on the EEG surcharge and repre-
sents a fundamental problem for the integration of inter-
mittent RES in the ‘energy only’ market. Moreover,
analyses of the causes of negative electricity prices show
that in times of negative prices, in addition to nuclear
power plants, particularly emission-intensive lignite coal-
fired power plants continue to operate at high load
[42,50]. Here, RES curtailment reduces incentives for con-
ventional power plant operators to curtail their operations
or invest in flexibilisation measures. From the climatevia participation in the balancing market. In comparison with their EEG
Figure 4 Specific direct marketing costs of different direct
marketers.
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ation is highly problematic [18,20,51].
The market premium under the EEG 2014 - a contribution
to a more objective-based market integration?
The main changes in the EEG 2014 concerning RES
market integration are the following: the mandatory
character of direct marketing for larger, new installa-
tions; the pricing-in of the management premium in the
reference prices used to calculate the market premium;
cuts in payments when prices are negative for prolonged
periods; and the introduction of remote control capabil-
ity as a requirement for payment of the market pre-
mium. Further implications arise from the general
decrease of remuneration rates, which is particularly
pronounced for bioenergy [52]. So, the question is, com-
pared with the EEG 2012, what changes can be expected
regarding the contribution of the market premium to
marketing efficiency and the promotion of demand-
driven and flexible electricity feed-in?
In terms of marketing efficiency, the exploitation of
the marketing channels used under the market premium
model in the EEG 2012 seems likely to continue since
there has been no change in the structure of the incen-
tives created. For biogas installations, flexibility of opera-
tors to design site-specific marketing concepts is
restricted by the newly introduced limit on the remuner-
ated quantity of electricity to 50% of the installation’s
power rating [53]. In that respect, it lessens the advan-
tage associated with direct marketing for these dispatch-
able RES of being able to optimise the marketing of
electricity and heat to suit the specific installation. In
particular, however, mandatory direct marketing in con-
junction with the reduced management premium is ex-
pected to have a tendency to strengthen larger direct
marketers who have lower marketing costs due to econ-
omies of scale and so can remain competitive [38]. The
mentioned tendency and economic impact of the direct
marketing costs in combination with a simultaneous
abolition of the management premium were examined
using the DLR simulation model described above (here,
the obligation implies that the management premium
paid out on top of the market premium under the EEG
2012 is no longer provided and is also not integrated in
the reference prices, as is the case under the EEG 2014).
The model accounts for fixed and variable costs of direct
marketers, i.e. fixed costs represent office rents, IT and
staffing costs and annual charges for trading, whereas
variable costs refer to the amount of traded electricity
and expenditures for electricity generation forecasts and
balancing power needed in case of deviation from gener-
ation schedule. As depicted by Figure 4, by way of ex-
ample, with the above-mentioned cost structure, the
specific marketing costs of the direct marketers inAMIRIS assume values between €1 per MWh and €3.50
per MWh for the simulation years 2012 to 2019. The
grey-shaded area illustrates the variation of the market-
ing costs as they are depending on the type of trader.
The extent of the costs is strongly dependent on the
composition of the trader’s portfolio - in contrast to dis-
patchable renewables, high shares of intermittent renew-
ables tend to result in higher costs to balance generation
and demand. The decrease of the maximum specific
costs until 2019 is due to an increasing size of portfolios
of the direct marketers, i.e. they profit from economies
of scale and improved forecast qualities over the years.
The simulated costs correspond quite accurately with es-
timates given by direct marketers based on experience
and show the eligible configuration of the model.
If marketing costs were no longer compensated by the
management premium, direct marketers’ revenues
would be reduced. Figure 5 shows AMIRIS simulation
results for the overall profit of the marketers under as-
sumption of a decreasing management premium ac-
cording to the EEG 2012 (light grey area) and a
complete abolition of the management premium (dark
grey area). The overall profit is defined as the difference
between total income and costs, and the areas represent
the variation of results of the different simulated direct
marketers. As can be seen, with a decreasing manage-
ment premium, the majority of the marketers still gain
positive overall profit; the reduction of the premium is
reflected in the diminution of the profit over the years,
with explicit gradient in 2012 and 2013. In contrast, the
abolition of the premium implies negative profits for all
simulated types of direct marketers, as the dark grey
area depicts. The decrease of the minimum profit until
2019 reflects the increasing expenditures for payments
Figure 5 Overall profits of different direct marketers. Overall
profits of different direct marketers in case of payment of a
decreasing management premium according to EEG 2012 (light
grey area) and in case of abolition of the management premium
(dark grey area). Overall profits of direct marketers in tens of
millions of euros.
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marketers still grows in the simulation.
Profit losses are accompanied by an increased pressure
to reduce costs that may lower the transaction costs of
marketing and thus improve efficiency. But as not all
direct marketers may have the possibility to reduce costs
as needed, an oligopolisation in the direct marketers’
market would weaken the bargaining power of RES pro-
ducers [18]. Furthermore, direct marketers would have
to ‘retrieve’ their costs from the installation operators in
order to achieve an at least comparatively balanced ac-
count. This would mean that the specific direct market-
ing costs could also be interpreted by installation
operators as a corresponding reduction of the remuner-
ation rates.
Hence, these simulations point to the following pos-
sible risks:
 Market concentration: Direct marketers with large
portfolios have comparatively lower marketing costs
because economies of scale in power trading and the
broad spatial distribution of RES feed-in installations
reduce costs. This can lead to concentration effects
and create dominant market positions for traders,
whose market power can make conditions more
difficult for further RES investments.
 Rising costs: If policy is aimed at preserving today’s
diversity among direct marketers and giving players
with smaller portfolios a chance to compete in the
market, it must allow higher specific marketing coststo be compensated, e.g. via a premium. The
compensation premiums required to promote a
heterogeneous market could subsequently result in
rising costs of support for electricity from renewable
energy sources.
 Lower remuneration: For installation operators,
mandatory direct marketing without payment of
compensation via the management premium implies
an indirect reduction in remuneration in the
amount of the specific marketing costs and a
reasonable margin of profit for intermediaries. This
effect could weaken investment incentives, especially
for intermittent RES.
In contrast to the effects on intermittent renewable
energy sources, the introduction of mandatory direct
marketing for dispatchable renewables such as biomass
installations presents a comparatively lower risk. In
addition, bringing dispatchable renewables onto the mar-
ket would increase their flexibilisation potential, pro-
vided the financing of a corresponding technological
design is guaranteed.
The temporally unlimited fall-back option provided by
§ 38 EEG 2014, meanwhile, is essentially to be wel-
comed, as capital investors would otherwise impose sig-
nificant risk premiums to account for cases where RES
producers lose their direct marketers [18,38]. However,
the 20% cut in remuneration results in substantial in-
come losses so that the exploitation of the feed-in tariff
in exceptional cases only provides a short-term option,
which in turn strengthens the bargaining position of dir-
ect marketers. Producers are therefore all the more
reliant on strong competition between direct marketers -
but precisely this competition may be diminished if econ-
omies of scale reduce the number of direct marketing
companies. Meanwhile, the remuneration of RES gener-
ation increasingly depends on the conclusion of individual
contracts and so predictability and transparency suffer.
How this will be reflected in risk calculations and invest-
ment inclination still has to be examined.
Regarding the promotion of demand-oriented feed-in,
it again makes sense to differentiate between dispatch-
able and intermittent renewables. In combination with
revenue prospects associated with a participation in bal-
ancing markets, the market premium scheme under the
EEG 2012 has set meaningful flexibilisation incentives
for bioenergy plants, particularly for biogas installations
eligible for the flexibility premium. In the EEG 2014,
there are interactions between market integration incen-
tives and the significant general cuts in remuneration for
bioenergy. To what extent new biomass installations are
economically feasible is questionable [52], so that the role
of new installations as a flexibility option in the electricity
system is likely to be limited. Although, in principle, the
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neration in the case of biogas installations provides an in-
centive to sell electricity at the highest possible price (see
above), it is likely to deteriorate further the profitability of
new installations. Furthermore, in terms of climate im-
pacts, the one-sided focus of the eligibility requirements
on flexibility should be evaluated critically because con-
cepts involving high levels of heat use - which lead to
higher reductions in greenhouse gas emissions compared
to pure electricity production [54] - are neglected. Hence,
as a flexibilisation option, mainly existing plants which
can claim the market premium based on the remuneration
under earlier versions of the EEG are likely to play a role.
Here, a flexibility premium that includes solid fuel-
powered biomass installations might have been appropri-
ate in order to encourage the relevant changes in feed-in
behaviour and make flexibilisation investments worth-
while [55].
On the side of intermittent renewables, the introduc-
tion of remote control capability as an eligibility require-
ment for new installations represents a sensible
amendment [32]. Apart from this, the lack of responsive-
ness of intermittent renewables to electricity price sig-
nals beyond curtailments continues to be a problem, and
it will only be aggravated by cutting remuneration in
times of negative electricity prices. While the market
premium under the EEG 2012 primarily served to pre-
vent negative price spikes, the new regulation is aimed
at curtailing production once prices fall below zero for
six or more consecutive hours. This encourages inter-
mittent RES producers with near-zero marginal costs to
curtail production before continuously operating con-
ventional power plants with positive marginal costs do
so - a situation which, from efficiency and climate policy
perspectives, does not appear advantageous. At the same
time, the existence of ‘moderate negative prices’ [41], p.
104, is considered to constitute an economically reason-
able means of sending flexibilisation signals to the oper-
ators of conventional power plants [5,18,41]. However,
the new regulation largely relieves the latter of responsi-
bility for implementing the system transformation; RES
operators tend to bear growing electricity price risks
[42,56], while the less frequent occurrence of negative
prices benefits conventional power plant operators, who
can avoid the costs of investing in flexibilisation. While
the new regulation might ease the EEG surcharge
burden in the short term, the long-term costs of
transforming the electricity system can be expected to
rise, since flexibility incentives for the system as whole
are reduced.
Conclusions
In summary, it can be stated that the sliding premium,
in the form in which it has been introduced in Germany,has made a positive contribution to the marketing effi-
ciency of dispatchable RES in particular, because it al-
lows for an individual optimisation of marketing
concepts including participation in balancing markets.
Meanwhile, the benefits of a greater demand orientation
of RES feed-in remain limited when considering the ex-
tent to which load shifting is incentivised. As a result of
the sharp cuts in the reference prices for bioenergy in
the EEG 2014, the recently introduced extended flexibili-
sation requirements for biogas plants are likely to be
relevant for only a small number of new installations.
Whether incentives for existing installations will be suffi-
cient in the long term to encourage load shifts beyond
the supply of negative balancing energy remains to be
investigated. For intermittent RES, incentives to encour-
age a change in feed-in behaviour are only effective in
times of negative electricity prices when voluntary cur-
tailment is encouraged. However, this simultaneously
leads to a reduction in urgently needed flexibilisation
signals to conventional power plants and other electri-
city market players, not least to the demand side or stor-
age concepts. This problem is exacerbated by the EEG
2014’s cuts in remuneration during prolonged negative
electricity prices. Meanwhile the fundamental problem
of the market integration of intermittent RES with near-
zero marginal costs - the fact that an increase in feed-in
amounts is associated with a decrease in market value -
remains unsolved.
Development trends in the market structure of direct
marketing service providers towards few large players
who can benefit from exploiting economies of scale and
tendering broad RES portfolios on the spot market also
show that direct marketing provides few structural
changes compared to marketing through TSOs, at least
in the case of intermittent RES. While the exploitation
of economies of scale is linked to reductions in transac-
tion costs and so can improve marketing efficiency, an
oligopolisation in the direct marketers’ market would
represent a problematic development: insufficient com-
petition between direct marketers would in particular
weaken the bargaining position of intermittent RES op-
erators, whose marketing is associated with higher costs
compared to dispatchable renewables. This could have a
negative impact on investment incentives.
So far, Germany’s experiences with the market pre-
mium and direct marketing suggest that, for the further
development of mechanisms to support greater market
proximity, differentiating between the various RES ac-
cording to their ability to respond to electricity price sig-
nals can prove advantageous [1,19,20]. Given the
experience gained to date, it seems doubtful whether an
increase in short-term electricity price risks can increase
the efficiency of supply of intermittent RES, rather than
just leading to higher risk premiums or reluctance to
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that rather than making direct marketing obligatory, it
may be advantageous to allow intermittent RES pro-
ducers a (non-reversible) choice between central market-
ing in combination with a low-risk but also low-profit
margin feed-in tariff and direct marketing in combin-
ation with an instrument that promotes market integra-
tion more comprehensively than an administered sliding
feed-in premium but compensates price risks with a
chance of higher returns [19]. Candidates for such an in-
strument could be competitively determined feed-in or
capacity premiums, the latter having the advantage of
not distorting spot market price signals [12,19,57]. The
continued marketing of intermittent RES by TSOs, on
the other hand, would require improved access to pro-
duction data and incentives to optimise central market-
ing of RES electricity. For dispatchable RES such as
bioenergy, meanwhile, refinancing models which have a
stronger competitive element in the determination of re-
muneration than the market premium could provide a
promising option to encourage operators to design site-
optimised installation concepts, which also exploit heat
marketing opportunities [19]. When designing support
for new installations, it should, however, be taken into
account that growing competition for cheap feedstocks
could endanger the supply of raw materials and the prof-
itability of existing plants [58].
Regarding the transition to competitive bidding pro-
cesses as promoted in the EU energy aid guidelines, it is
necessary to critically discuss the question of how a
stronger integration of different RES in existing electri-
city markets can actually contribute to improving secur-
ity of supply, reducing the costs of RES expansion and
transforming the electricity system. The case study of
the German market premium clearly points out that
these targets cannot be reached through market integra-
tion efforts on the part of RES alone. Rather, electricity
market conditions must also be adapted to the require-
ments of RES, and flexibilisation incentives are needed
for other participants in the electricity market [41,59].
Considering the uncertainties and country-specific con-
ditions that have to be taken into account in a combined
reform of the design of the electricity market and RES
support mechanisms, competition between systems with
different approaches in the different member states
could have advantages over a one-size-fits-all approach
as formulated in the EU guidelines on state aid [60].Endnotes
aCalculated according to [33,34] in conjunction with EEG
2012 Annex 4 and the Management Premium Ordinance
(MaPrV) 2012 [35]. The exact value is determined by the
share of intermittent RES installations that were eligible toclaim the higher management premium rate for installa-
tions with remote control capability.
bWood gasifiers, which are still in an infant stage and
do not play a significant role in the stock of biogas in-
stallations, are excluded from the assessment since they
do not participate in direct marketing.
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